Familiarity Breeds Contempt or Deference?

An Empirical Study of Appellate Judicial Panels[†]

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Abstract

Several studies have highlighted the role of familiarity, alongside collegiality, in influencing judicial behaviors within U.S. federal courts. Nevertheless, the unique characteristics of the U.S. judicial system may not always provide the most suitable context for exploring the presence of cognitive biases. This study leverages a comprehensive dataset of 84,335 appellate court decisions on civil cases in Taiwan to investigate the effects of familiarity within a career judge system. Unlike the U.S., Taiwanese lower court judges undergo a process of temporary promotion to appellate courts for three years before returning to district courts for additional tenure. By analyzing the judicial conduct during their initial and subsequent promotions and comparing it with the behavior of permanent appellate judges, we uncover similar biases among Taiwanese judges as those documented in existing literature. The substantial size and diversity of our dataset, coupled with the random assignment of court cases in Taiwan, reinforce the argument that judicial biases are prevalent and consistent across different legal systems. Furthermore, we delineate two specific sources of familiarity, clearly differentiating them from collegiality, thereby contributing to a deeper understanding of the nuances influencing judicial decision-making.

Keywords

Home court bias, empathy bias, general bias, fading effect, mixed panels, anticipatory collegiality, social identification, random assignments of cases

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I. Introduction

Conventional wisdom suggests that familiarity breeds contempt. Yet, when it comes to the judiciary, does this axiom hold true? Emerging research within judicial behavior studies is challenging this notion, revealing that familiarity can often lead to deference among judges, occasionally bordering on favoritism, and can also enhance cooperation. Leveraging a unique, large dataset encompassing 16 years within a career judge system, this study delves into the nuances of familiarity among judges. It aims to dissect the dual-edged sword of familiarity, examining both the advantages, such as tacit knowledge acquisition, and the drawbacks, including the ill effect of cognitive biases, that are encompassed within the broad concept of familiarity.

Currently, there are six competing and sometimes overlapping approaches to the study of judicial behaviors: attitudinal model, legalism, "thinking fast" judging, identity accounts, labor market model, and strategic accounts (Epstein and Knight 2024 forthcoming). This research engages with the collegiality and familiarity literature that is discussed under the rubric of labor market model, though the cognitive bias induced by familiarity could also be classified as an example of "thinking fast" judging. Collegiality is an effort to build a positive relationship with co-workers, in this context particularly other judges on the same court. The extensive literature on collegiality (e.g., Cross and Tiller 1998; Epstein and Knight 2017: 327) points out that collegiality, among others, changes votes (Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson 2018), and reduces dissenting rates (e.g., Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2011).

Familiarity is closely related to collegiality, but in certain contexts like ours, familiarity may create tension with collegiality. Swalve (2022: 223) argues that familiarity is antecedent to collegiality, but Epstein and Knight (2024 forthcoming)

point out that judges often have little control over whom to serve with in a panel and where their offices are — ways to get familiar with one another — but judges can decide not to be collegial (see also Nash 2022: 1576–1582). Collegiality and familiarity can be clearly distinguished in at least certain contexts. Collegiality requires that judges work on their relationship with their current colleagues, and perhaps imminent future colleagues (Blanes i Vidal and Leaver 2013; 2015). But what about former colleagues? As collegiality goes, that relationship with former colleagues deteriorates may affect a judge's private life, but is unlikely to affect the current working environment. Yet, judges are familiar with their former colleagues and may be prone to defer to or favor them, such as reversing their appealed cases less often (Lemley and Miller 2015; Lin and Chang 2023). This action, however, may harm collegiality, as other judges serving in the panel who are not familiar with the reviewed judge may be inclined to reverse for legal reasons. Therefore, while collegiality and familiarity are both considerations about maintaining good relationships with fellow judges in the court system, neither collegiality nor familiarity may explain all aspects of judicial behaviors. Collegiality and familiarity may dictate conflicting actions.

Moreover, familiarity, as used in the judicial behavior literature on beyond, has two distinct meanings that lead to different normative implications, and yet they have been – sometimes confusingly – grouped together in the concept of familiarity. What we call Type-1 familiarity originates from social identification. Mutual fund managers overweigh stocks from their home states (Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker 2012). Credit analysts are more generous when rating issuers from their home states than when rating issues from outside the state (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen 2020). What we call Type-2 familiarity arises from agents' tacit knowledge about collaborators (Littlepage, Robison, and Reddington 1997; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2012) and business matters (Ang,

de Jong, and van der Poel 2014; Wang and Yin 2018). This type of familiarity could also come from trust developed in collaboration (Jones and George 1998). The two causes of familiarity sometimes appear in tandem. Therefore, this article will estimate the effect of one type of familiarity in judicial panels while controlling for the other type of familiarity.

This research uses 80,000 plus substantive appellant civil decisions by the second-instance courts in Taiwan to examine whether familiarity among judges affects judicial decisions. Random assignment of court cases in Taiwan enables us to identify causally. An idiosyncratic program in which a majority of the appellate court judges in our research period served a three-year term as a temporary visiting judge enables us to examine the tension between collegiality and familiarity on a large scale. These temporarily promoted judges are particularly torn between being collegial with permanent members of the appellate courts and being collegial (partly due to familiarity) with their former, and also perhaps future, colleagues.

Our main findings are that appellate court judges reversed cases from their former home court less frequently than reversed cases from other courts. Type-1 familiarity here appears to trump collegiality. In addition, the temporarily promoted judges reversed less often than permanent members of the appellate courts, though they did not favor their former home court more, suggesting that Type-2 familiarity with former colleagues is not very salient. More tellingly, judges who were promoted permanently to the appellate court after a previous temporary promotion also reversed less often in the first three years than they did since the fourth year. Type-1 familiarity and collegiality are both at work. Finally, panels of judges from different court sections reverse less often than panels of judges from the same court section. While judges from different sections work in the same court, the judicial administrative structure makes

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their collaboration exceptional. Hence, collegiality should not be a huge concern when judges from different sections sit on the bench together; rather, the unfamiliarity with one another hinders them from reversing the lower court. Here we find evidence for Type-2 familiarity.

The rest of this article is structured as follows: Part II lays out the concrete hypotheses and placed them within the prior literature. Part III explains our identification strategy, including detailed model specifications. Part IV summarizes the four sources of data. Part V discusses our findings. Part VI concludes.

II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This part lays out the five research questions and seven hypotheses built on the judicial behavior literature related to collegiality and familiarity. To make it easier to refer to throughout the paper, we will give short labels to the biases and behavioral effects discussed below.

One distinct feature of the Taiwanese court makes this article a study of panel effect rather than individual effect, and the feature makes any significant finding even more remarkable. Unlike studies of federal courts in the U.S. that utilize individual judge votes, our study uses the outcome of the panel decision as the dependent variable, because there is no such thing as a judge vote in a High Court panel; rather, judges deliberate as a panel until they reach one decision. Even in the rare instance when a judge strongly disagrees with the two co-panelists and writes a dissenting opinion, the opinion will be collected in the docket but not publicized. According to our interviews with judges, it is widely perceived that High Court judges rarely write dissenting opinions. Thus, our regression framework examines whether the various judge-level and panel-level factors affect panel decisions, not individual judge votes. Any

statistically and practically significant findings in our study thus mean that one of the three judges' preference, say favoring a former colleague, not only affect their own "vote" / inclination, but also affect other judges on the panel. Such an effect would be more difficult to uncover. Suppose all judges stand firm in their position and are never persuaded as to reverse an appeal or not, a single judge's preference to favor a former colleague will not change the case outcome, though had judges had to vote, we would have observed their different attitudes. Thanks to collegiality concerns, many studies have found that having, say, one female judge (with two other male judges) or one Democrat judge (with two other Republic judges) on the panel change the dispositions of other judges as well (e.g., Revesz 1997: 1719; Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 2004: 319; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010). Hence, while the prior literature engaged below studied individual judicial votes, the mechanism that works on individual judges could potentially change panel decisions.

Our research questions all center around familiarity, but it is not always possible to isolate what type of familiarity is at work. For instance, a temporarily promoted judges may refrain from reversing cases from their home courts because they identify with the home court (Type 1) or because they know how hard judges in home courts work (Type 2). The first cause would lead TP judges to consciously give their friends a favor or subconsciously embrace fellow judges' decisions. The second cause would lead TP judges to reverse less frequently because they defer to fellow judges who are closer to the dispute. The first cause is normatively problematic while the second cause may even be evaluated as beneficial. Below we elaborate our hypotheses in more detail.

A. *Home Court Bias*

Our first research question is whether appellate court judges reverse cases from

their former home courts less often than cases from other lower courts. The prior literature studies two different biases: the "general bias" held by promoted appellate judges toward the lower level of courts that the appellate judges have served in and the "specific bias" toward the "home court" — that is, the specific lower court that the appellate judges have served in (Epstein et al. 2009: 868–870).[1] Budziak (2016) finds that U.S. appellate court judges in 1946–1996 demonstrate both the general bias and the specific bias. Epstein et al. (2009) find that the U.S. Supreme Court justices do not demonstrate general bias toward the federal circuit courts in general but do exhibit substantial specific bias toward the "home court." We will call the specific bias "home court bias." Perhaps due to a bias that is similar to the general bias, Linder and Niles (2008) find that in criminal sentencing cases that came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit between 2003 and 2007, judges who have served in *state* trial courts are more likely to vote to affirm, a result consistent with Posner (2008: 74)'s observation that appellate court judges with district court experiences can feel for the fact-finders.

Taiwan's judicial system enables us to test whether Taiwanese appellate judges demonstrate home court bias. Like appellate judges in the U.S., appellate judges in Taiwan hear cases from multiple lower courts. But unlike them, *all* appellate judges in Taiwan have served in district courts for an extended period of time, usually more than 10 years. In a career judge system (very common in civil-law countries), judges start their careers at the bottom and work their way up in the judicial hierarchy. All judges thus would have the general bias. Nevertheless, because most Taiwanese appellate judges handle appeals from both former home courts and other district courts,[2] we can

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[1] In our data, a judge may have served in multiple district courts and the last district court served before being promoted to an appellate court is considered the (former) home court.

[2] Take the 201 temporarily promoted judges in our data as an example, 172 of them (86%) were promoted to an appellate court that has jurisdictions over their former home courts.

estimate the effect of the home court bias. Based on the theories and empirical findings in the prior literature, our first hypothesis is that Taiwanese appellate judges demonstrated home court bias. More formally,

Hypothesis (1): The reversal rate among cases appealed from home courts is lower than that among cases appealed from other district courts.

B. *Empathy Bias*

Our second research question is whether appellate court judges who are only temporarily promoted reverse cases less often than permanent appellate court judges. After spending about fifteen years at district courts, Taiwanese judges can apply for participation in the "transitory promotion" (TP) program. The TP program typically promotes district court judges to an appellate court for three years (sometimes one or two years; Figure 1), and then sends these TP judges back to a district court — usually, the former home court.[3] Several years after TP judges return to a district court, some of them will be permanently promoted to appellate courts.[4] In the U.S., federal district judges could sit by designation on federal circuit courts and state lower court judges could sit by designation on state supreme courts (Saphire 1994; Brudney and Ditslear 2001; Cohen 2002; Benesh 2006; Collins and Martinek 2011; Black and Owens 2013; Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014; Lemley and Miller 2015; Budziak 2017; Chang and Miller 2023: 232). The sitting by designation in the U.S. is also transitory but typically much shorter (less than one week). Still, while lower court judges visit appellate courts, Sayer, Hess, and Hall (2021: 464, 471) find that a federal circuit court panel that

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[3] Among the 134 temporarily promoted judges in our data who eventually returned to a district court (see Table 3), 99 (74%) went to back to their home courts.

[4] For more background information on the TP program, see Lin and Chang (2023). For more background information on civil litigation in Taiwan, see Chang and Hubbard (2019; 2021), Chang and Tu (2020), Lin, Chang, and Chen (2018), Chen, Huang, and Lin (2015), Eisenberg and Huang (2012), Huang, Chen, and Lin (2010), and Huang (2008; 2009).

includes a visiting judge affirm district court decisions more often, due to visiting judges' empathy toward their colleagues. Levy (2019: 115)'s interviews with federal courts of appeals judges also suggest that trial judges who are sitting by designation in appellate courts are less inclined to reverse trial court colleagues. We call this "empathy bias."

The empathy bias works differently in the U.S. and Taiwan. For judges in the U.S. sitting by designation, the empathy bias is triggered by familiarity and collegiality with their long-term colleagues in the lower court, and they should not concern too much about collegiality with the appellate court judges, as they visit for only a very brief period. Of course, visiting judges may want to leave a good impression if they perceive the visit as an opportunity for auditioning (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013). By contrast, for TP judges in Taiwan, the empathy bias would be countered by consideration of collegiality with the appellate court judges, as they will co-work for three years. It is also an open secret that the TP program is partly for auditioning purposes.

The empathy bias and the general bias should be further distinguished. The general bias toward the level of court a judge has served in, at least for judges permanently promoted, arises from familiarity rather than collegiality. By contrast, the empathy bias held by temporarily promoted judges arises from both familiarity and collegiality — this is where the two mechanisms are intertwined. No previous empirical works appear to have compared and contrasted the two, nor controlled for their potentially confounding effects. In our context, as all appellate judges have been promoted from lower courts, all of them are subject to the general bias, but TP judges who are still affiliated with a lower court could demonstrate the empathy bias on top of the general bias. Hence, comparing the TP judges with permanent appellate court judges enables

us to tease out the empathy bias, without the confounding effect of the general bias.

Based on the theories and empirical findings in the prior literature, our second hypothesis is that TP judges in a Taiwanese appellate court reverse less often than permanent judges in the same court. More formally,

Hypothesis (2): The reversal rate among cases handled by TP judges is lower than that among cases handled by permanent appellate court judges.

C. *Interaction of Biases*

Our third research question is whether temporarily promoted judges are less prone to reverse home court cases. In other words, we inquire whether the interaction of the home court bias and the empathy bias creates an even bigger effect. Both permanent appellate judges and TP judges could demonstrate the home court bias, but only TP judges could demonstrate the empathy bias. No previous works appear to have tested whether the interaction creates a bigger effect, in part because judges sitting by designation do not spend enough time in appellate courts to hear (enough) cases from home courts and other courts. Thanks to the three-year stint design in Taiwan, most judges in our data set handled cases from both types of courts. In the English Court of Appeal, when judges know that they will soon sit on a panel with a High Court judge, they will be less likely, beforehand, to reverse the High Court judge's judicial decisions (Blanes i Vidal and Leaver 2013; 2015). As TP judges anticipate returning to home courts after the TP stint ends and become colleagues with home court judges again, they may reverse home courts less than other courts to a larger extent than the permanent judges do. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis (3): The reversal rate among home court cases handled by TP judges is lower than that among other cases handled by TP judges and all case handled by

permanent High Court judges.

Empathy bias toward home courts is the combination of existing familiarity and anticipatory collegiality. One example of anticipatory collegiality is the "elevator effect," meaning that appellate judges avoid the awkwardness of taking the elevator with lower court judges whose decisions they reversed by being inclined to reverse less often judges with whom they may interact more frequently (Hazelton, Hinkle, and Nelson 2023a) — see also Nelson, Hazelton, and Hinkle (2022); Hazelton, Hinkle, and Nelson (2023b). Anticipatory collegiality is also uncovered in the English Court of Appeal, where judges are less inclined to reverse cases appealed from English High Court, when they are about to interact with judges from there (Blanes i Vidal and Leaver 2015).

In the Taiwan context, we are not able to test the literal elevator effect, because all High Courts and District Courts are in separate buildings. Two pairs of High Courts and District Courts are next to, or very close to, each other, but because all High Court judges work in the same building and all District Court judges do the same, there is no variation necessary to test whether the elevator effect exists. Yet the anticipatory collegiality behind the elevator effect — the lower reversal rate in anticipation of social interaction or professional collaboration — is included the test under Hypothesis (3). TP judges are likely to go back to home courts, so they may reverse less frequently cases from home courts, in order to appease former/future colleagues. Although in district courts, judges generally work alone and form panels only when an apprentice judge is assigned a case or when a summary-proceeding case or a small-claim case is appealed, future social interaction — in elevators, restaurants, or judge housing — should give TP judges pause when they consider reversing cases from home courts.

D. *Fading Effect*

Our fourth research question is whether the effect of the general and empathy biases fade with time, as Budziak (2016) finds it to be the case with the general bias. As previously noted, the general bias comes from familiarity, not collegiality. Budziak (2016) uses the social identity theory to explain familiarity: judges, after being permanently promoted from District Courts to High Courts, would initially still socially identify themselves with District Courts, but as time goes by, they would settle into the new role and mindset of High Court judges. That is, their general bias fades over time. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis (4): The reversal rate among cases handled by permanent judges is lower in the first three years of their appellate court tenure than that in later years.

The situation with TP judges is more complicated. As TP judges are promoted only temporarily, their empathy bias would initially make them reverse less often than their permanent colleagues. Nevertheless, even if the empathy effect would tend to weaken over time as they get used to being High Court judges, their imminent return to District Courts could intensify their empathy bias toward the end of the TP stint. Therefore, the empathy effect would not fade with time.

Hypothesis (5): The reversal rate among cases handled by TP judges does not increase with time during their TP stint.

E. *Different Role, Different Effect*

The Taiwanese judges in our preceding hypotheses refer to the assigned judges, but not the presiding judges and side judges. That is, we conjecture that the panel effects created by the assigned judges are the largest. The assigned judges are responsible for all the preparatory work that goes into an appeal case and for writing a court decision.

If the aforementioned biases are detectable, they should be the most salient on assigned judges. The most senior judge on an appellate court panel, usually the section chief, serves as the presiding judge. The presiding judge chairs and conducts the open trial and could affect case outcomes with her administrative authority and seniority. In our context, as only 0.05% of the presiding judges are TP judges (not surprisingly, as they normally are the most junior), we do not expect to detect any meaningful effect regarding TP judges in the presiding role. Besides, in practice, side judges are passive and have neither the stature of the presiding judge qua section chief nor the opportunity to shape the course of the trial and the direction the decision takes. Thus, we also do not expect to find that presiding judges and side judges create observable differences in reversal rates. At the very least, the panel effects should be more salient on assigned judges than on presiding and side judges. More formally,

Hypothesis (6): The effects found in Hypotheses (1)–(5) are larger regarding assigned judges than regarding presiding or side judges.

F. *Mixed Panel Effect*

Our fifth and final research question is whether judges who work less frequently together are prone not to reverse as compared to those who often collaborate and thus are familiar with one another. In the context of German Constitutional Court, Swalve (2022: 240) finds that justices who serve together longer tend to produce longer (presumably better) opinions, as familiar panel members are more likely to share candid opinions and less likely to enter conflicts. In addition, Engel (2022) demonstrates that the longer the justices have served in the same panel, the more likely they are to declare a law unconstitutional—one of the more politically difficult decisions a judge can make. While reversing a case is not as serious as declaring a statute unconstitutional, our

informal interviews with judges in Taiwan reveal that judges strongly dislike being reversed,[5] so a career judge in Taiwan would not take a reversal lightly either. Therefore, like an unconstitutional declaration writ small, a reversal is more likely when judges in the panel are more familiar with one another. As explained in more detail below, a High Court is composed of multiple sections, and judges within one section form panels with one another. We call this "pure panels." Panels composed of judges from multiple sections — we call this "mixed panels" — are exceptional (7% in our data; Table 2). Therefore, judges in mixed panels have collaborated less often than judges in pure panels. Hence, we expect to find the following:

Hypothesis (7): The reversal rate among cases handled by pure panels is higher than that among cases handled by mixed panels.

III.   IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

This part elaborates our empirical method. Section A describes random assignment of judicial cases in Taiwan that constitutes our identification strategy. Section B lays out the specifications of our linear probability models.

A.   *Random Assignment of Cases*

All cases in the Taiwanese courts are randomly assigned to judges. When a case is filed in a District Court or a High Court, it is allocated to a "case track" strictly based on the amount claimed by a plaintiff and the nature of the claim.[6] Staff at a High Court

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[5] See the discussion of reversal aversion in the American context in Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013: 49) and Posner (2008: 70–71).

[6] Once a case is allocated to a case track, each court uses computer algorithms to randomly assign cases within each case track to a "court unit." Each court unit contains a judge and a clerk. Thus, cases can be conceptualized as being randomly assigned to judges. Judges we interviewed believe that random assignment of cases is the best way to ensure that judges have equal workload, so judges have

filing office first checks whether the claimed amount surpasses six million New Taiwan Dollars (approximately US$200,000). If it does, the case is put to the high-stake case track; if it does not, the case is put to the ordinary-stake case track, unless the claimed amount is less than 1.5 million New Taiwan Dollars (approximately US$50,000), in which case the dispute is put to the relatively-low-stake case track. In our data set, 17%, 33%, and 32% of the cases were in the high-stake, ordinary-stake, and relatively-low-stake case track, respectively. The remaining 18% of the cases have their own specialized case tracks, as they involve certain pre-specified dispute types, like international trade, labor disputes, maritime law, consumer law, election law, medical malpractice, etc. Sometimes, a specialized section in the court oversees a certain specialized case track and those cases are randomly assigned to judges in such a section — but more often cases in the specialized case tracks are randomly assigned to all judges in a court. The reasons for creating multiple case tracks are to increase the likelihood that judges shoulder equal burdens and to send certain types of lawsuits (e.g., labor disputes) to specialized sections. Lin and Chang (2023) have empirically confirmed that District Courts and High Courts in Taiwan randomly assign cases to judges.

High Courts in Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung contain multiple court sections, and a court section typically includes three or four court units. As Table 1 shows, at least 83% (69,933 / 84,335) of the cases in our data set were decided by a panel within a court section with three or four judges; in addition, among the cases reported in Table 1, 63% of them were decided by a panel within a court section with at least one TP judge. The Hualien High Court contains only one big section (at least 85% of the cases were rendered when there was one or more TP judges in the section).

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incentives to ensure that cases are assigned randomly.

Due to this difference, cases decided there are not included in all of our regressions.

Appellate courts in Taiwan always form a panel of three judges to decide cases. Judges of the same section form a panel of three following pre-specified and publicly announced orders. Court sections are like modules: judges within a section interact very frequently but rarely sit on the bench with out-of-section judges in the same High Court. The exception is that when judges in a section are depleted due to recusal, leave of absence, or other reasons, out-of-section judges will join the panel, again according to pre-specified and publicly announced rules. Hence, formation of panels in appellate courts in Taiwan is certainly not random, but it is not subject to manipulation by individual judges, either. For our identification, what matters is that appellate court judges or panels cannot pick cases they like or dislike.

On such a panel, an assigned judge is the judge who has been randomly assigned to an appeal case. Assigned judges are responsible for all the preparatory work that goes into an appeal case and for writing a court decision. The most senior judge on an appellate court panel, usually the section chief, serves as the presiding judge. The third judge on the panel is the side judge, who participates in panel deliberation. TP judges generally serve as either the assigned judge or the side judge. While our regression specification still distinguishes presiding judges who are permanent or TP, readers should not be too concerned with any statistically significant result related to the presiding judge being a TP judge, as no more than 0.05% of the cases involved this scenario.

B. *Model Specifications*

We ran a linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered by assigned

judges. Our regression models take the following form:

$$D_{ihdt} = \sum_{j=\{A,P,S\}} \left[\beta_{1j} TP_{ihdt}^j + (\beta_{2j} BL_{ihdt}^j + \beta_{3j} TP_{ihdt}^j \times BL_{ihdt}^j) + \mu_h^j \right]$$

$$+ \delta\, OP_{ihdt} + X_{ihdt}\gamma + \mu_d + \eta_t + \epsilon_{ihdt} \tag{1}$$

where the dependent variable D_{ihdt} is whether the case i appealed from District Court d at time t was reversed by a High Court (with judge h as the assigned, presiding, or side judges), with a complete or partial reversal coded as 1 and a dismissal of appeals coded as 0.[7]

Our first set of treatment variables $TP_{ihdt}^j, j = \{A, P, S\}$ are all dummy variables, representing whether assigned judges (A), presiding judges (P), and side judges (S), respectively, are TP judges. That is, for instance, TP_{ihdt}^A is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the assigned judge in the case was at the time a TP judge, and it equals 0 if the assigned judge was a permanent judge at High Court at the time of the case. This variable tests Hypothesis (2).

In addition, BL_{ihdt}^j, $j = \{A, P, S\}$ are also all dummy variables, representing whether the appealed decision comes from the (former) home court of assigned judges (A), presiding judges (P), and side judges (S), respectively. That is, for instance, BL_{ihdt}^A equals 1 if the assigned judge served in district court C before being promoted to an appellate court, and the appealed case in question was rendered by district court C. This set of variables test Hypothesis (1). As Hypothesis (6) predicts, among the three, BL_{ihdt}^A is the most likely to be negative and statistically significant.

Another set of treatment variables, $TP_{ihdt}^j \times BL_{ihdt}^j$, is interaction terms of the previous two sets. Hypothesis (3) predicts that $TP_{ihdt}^A \times BL_{ihdt}^A$ would be negative and

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[7] Note that the Civil Division in High Courts review cases de novo; that is, High Courts can reverse lower court decisions on the basis of either questions of law or questions of fact.

statistically significant.

The final treatment variable, OP_{ihdt}, captures whether a case was rendered by mixed or pure panels. A mixed panel coded as 1, whereas a pure panel is coded as 0. Hypothesis (7) predicts that this variable has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant.

Time fixed effects, η_t, are captured by 18 variables representing the years in which a case entered the court system. Each district court is a dummy of its own (μ_d). Assigned, presiding, and side judge fixed effects (μ_h^j, $j = \{A, P, S\}$) are also included.

Other control variables, X_{ihdt}, include a dummy variable on whether in a case the assigned judge is also the presiding judge;[8] a dummy variable on whether we cannot know for sure which judge is the presiding judge in a case; a dummy variable on whether panel composition rules and section member information are missing, as they were not provided to us by the High Courts. X_{ihdt} also include case type and claim type dummies. First, each case's citation contains information about case tracks. All High Court cases are first distinguished, for case track purposes, based on the amount at stake, into relatively low stake, ordinary stake, and high stake. Two dummy variables are used to control for the stake. Some cases are further distinguished based on the substantive issues involved (see above) and 12 additional variables are used to capture these issues. Second, depending on whether certain keywords capturing the most prevalent causes of action were invoked in a case, a case was coded as related to property, contracts, commercial law, procedural law, labor law, and other disputes.

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[8] When the assigned judge is the section chief, the assigned judge also serves as the presiding judge, and the two other judges in a panel are both side judges. In our regressions, as long as one of the two side judges is a TP judge, TP_{ihdt}^S equals 1. In addition, if one of the two side judges last worked in the district court that generated the appeal, $TP_{ihdt}^S \times BL_{ihdt}^S$, is coded as 1. If the assigned qua presiding judge is a TP judge, both TP_{ihdt}^A and TP_{ihdt}^P equal 1. As Table 3 indicates, this is extremely rare, with only 38 cases.

These variables are not mutually exclusive; thus, a case could be coded as involving multiple claim types, such as both contracts and commercia law.

Moreover, in order to tease out whether the familiarity effect intensifies or fades out with time, we can replace the bracketed part in formula (1) with

$$\left[\sum_{g} [\beta_{1j,g} TP_{ihdt}^{j} \times 1(g)_{ihdt}^{j} + (\beta_{3j,g} TP_{ihdt}^{j} \times BL_{ihdt}^{j} \times 1(g)_{ihdt}^{j})] + \beta_{2j} BL_{ihdt}^{j} + \mu_{h}^{j} \right]$$

Therefore, we have

$$D_{ihdt} = \sum_{j=\{A,P,S\}} \left[\sum_{g} [\beta_{1j,g} TP_{ihdt}^{j} \times 1(g)_{ihdt}^{j} \right.$$

$$+ (\beta_{3j,g} TP_{ihdt}^{j} \times BL_{ihdt}^{j} \times 1(g)_{ihdt}^{j})] + \beta_{2j} BL_{ihdt}^{j} + \mu_{h}^{j} \Bigg]$$

$$+ \delta OP_{ihdt} + X_{ihdt}\gamma + \mu_{d} + \eta_{t} + \epsilon_{ihdt} \tag{2}$$

where g is the N_{th} year in which a TP judge serves in a High Court. $1(g)_{ihdt}^{j}$ are dummy variables that equal 1 if the case in question is handled in year g of a TP judge j's tenure in a High Court. As the TP stint is for three years, g equals 1, 2, or 3. $\beta_{1j,g} TP_{ihdt}^{j} \times 1(g)_{ihdt}^{j}$ examines Hypothesis (5).

To test the related Hypothesis (4), we will run two other sets of separate regressions that examine whether these permanently promoted judges in their first three years as non-TP appellate judges would tend not to reverse, despite having High Court experiences from their TP years. (As most TP judges served in a High Court for three years, we compare that period with the first three years of the tenure of these permanently promoted judges.) In the first set, only cases handled by former TP judges who have been permanently promoted to High Courts after returning to district courts following the TP stint are included. We use the same specifications with regard to presiding judges and side judges as in Equation (1) while using the specifications in

Equation (2) for assigned judges. That is, we replace bracketed part in Equation (1) with new specifications, and get Equation (3):

$$D_{ihdt} = \sum_{j=\{P,S\}} (\beta_{1j} TP_{ihdt}^j + \beta_{3j} TP_{ihdt}^j \times BL_{ihdt}^j) + \sum_{j=\{A,P,S\}} [\beta_{2j} BL_{ihdt}^j + \mu_h^j]$$
$$+ \sum_{g'} \beta_{4,g'} FTP_{ihdt}^A \times 1'(g')_{ihdt}^A$$
$$+ \delta\, OP_{ihdt} + X_{ihdt}\gamma + \mu_d + \eta_t + \epsilon_{ihdt} \qquad (3)$$

where FTP_{ihdt}^A is a dummy variable representing whether assigned judges are former TP judges who have been permanently promoted to High Courts, after going back to district courts following their TP stints. g' is the N_{th} year in which a former TP judge who has been permanently promoted to High Courts (that is, here, their experiences as TP judges are not taken into account). $1'(g')_{ihdt}^j$ are dummy variables that equal 1 if the case in question is handled in year g'.

In the second set of new regressions, we focus on permanently promoted judges serving as side judges rather than assigned judges. Equation (4) resembles Equation (3), except that the signs for assigned judges and side judges are switched:

$$D_{ihdt} = \sum_{j=\{A,P\}} (\beta_{1j} TP_{ihdt}^j + \beta_{3j} TP_{ihdt}^j \times BL_{ihdt}^j) + \sum_{j=\{A,P,S\}} [\beta_{2j} BL_{ihdt}^j + \mu_h^j]$$
$$+ \sum_{g'} \beta_{4,g'} FTP_{ihdt}^S \times 1'(g')_{ihdt}^S$$
$$+ \delta\, OP_{ihdt} + X_{ihdt}\gamma + \mu_d + \eta_t + \epsilon_{ihdt} \qquad (4)$$

IV. DATA

Section A introduces the four sources of our data. Section B explains that due to missing information from some sources and the unique structure in one of the High Courts, we run the regressions with different numbers of observations.

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A. *Sources and Scope*

This article uses all the substantive,[9] appellate[10] decisions rendered by the civil sections in the five High Courts in Taiwan between July 1, 2003 and June 30, 2019. Our data start in 2003 because the TP program started in 2003 and the administrative data in and after 2003 are more reliable. Our data end at mid-2019 because we only have full texts of all decisions before June 30, 2019. In total, our data set includes 84,335 court decisions. Summary statistics of key variables of these decisions are presented in Table 2 and Table A. 1.

The information required by our research design comes from multiple official sources. First, in 2019, the Judicial Yuan, the administrative organ of the judicial system in Taiwan, provided the full texts of all decisions rendered by the civil sections before June 30, 2019. Anyone may manually check and download cases from the official website of the Judicial Yuan.[11]

Second, the Judicial Yuan coded a plethora of variables regarding each dispute filed in courts. Its administrative data set can be freely downloaded from its website.[12]

Third, to identify all the TP and non-TP appellate judges and the district courts they have served in before moving to the appellate court, we cross-checked the court decision data with another source of information: the meeting minutes of the Personnel Review Committee at the Judicial Yuan,[13] which informed us of which judges were

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[9] Appeals that were procedurally dismissed or transferred for jurisdictional reasons are excluded. We also excluded cases that were remanded by the Supreme Court, as the appellate court does not have the full discretion regarding whether to reverse the district court decisions.

[10] In a small set of cases, the High Courts are legally required to be the court of first instance. These cases are excluded.

[11] *See* https://judgment.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/default.aspx.

[12] https://opendata.judicial.gov.tw/.

[13] The meeting minutes are available on-line at https://www.judicial.gov.tw/tw/lp-1915-1.html and https://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/GNNWS/Personnel.asp?page=10. Minutes for meetings held before 2002 are

transferred or promoted to which courts at what time. In total, there are 412 appellate judges in our data,[14] 215 of whom were TP judges during our research period. Among the 215 judges, 134 (62%) returned to district courts after typically serving for three years at a High Court (Figure 1; Table 3).

Fourth, most High Courts are composed of multiple civil sections and section members form a three-judge panel to handle appealed cases. Each year, each High Court announced on its website the section affiliation of all judges, with whom each judge will form a panel, and the order of judges who will fill in for an absent judge in a panel. Such information from previous years has been removed from the websites of High Courts. We asked each High Court for such information and acquired it for most studied years.

There are three levels of courts in Taiwan that handle civil cases: 22 District Courts, 6 High Courts, and the Taiwan Supreme Court. In this article, we refer to the former two as the district courts and the appellate courts or District Courts and High Courts. 20 District Courts and 5 High Courts are included in this study. Only the two small district courts not on the Island of Taiwan and their High Court are excluded, because that High Court has only three judges that handle both criminal and civil disputes and very few TP judges went to that High Court, so it is not ideal for our research design.

B. *Regressions with Different Numbers of Observations*

We ran six LPM models with almost the same specification. The main differences across the models are the cases included. As the preceding section explains, four sources of information are used in this study and not all cases have all the relevant information.

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available in print only.

[14] 408 of the 412 judges have been assigned judges of High Court cases (Table 3).

Column (1) of Table 1 reports regression results using cases with all necessary information and rendered by pure panels. The other five models stack additional observations batch by batch.

Column (2) contains cases rendered by mixed panels, in addition to all cases used in the first regression reported in column (1). Testing the effect of unfamiliarity of working with judges from other sections is one of our main research questions, but these cases are removed from the first regression due to potential concerns that other aspects of these cases may be different in an unobservable way. (We do not have reasons to believe that they are different, though.) Our preferred models are those reported in columns (1) and (2), as all the key information is exact.

The third regression, reported in column (3), adds in cases from the Hualien High Court, which is unique because all judges are included in one large section. In years when the Hualien High Court has provided us with data, the section contains 10, 11, 12, or 14 judges. Moreover, unlike judges in the other four studied High Courts, judges in the Hualien High Court handle both criminal and civil cases. Only the latter is included in our study.

The fourth regression, reported in column (4), adds in cases where information regarding the exact section composition is missing but we infer the section composition using that from the previous year. More specifically, Tainan High Court 2010; Kaohsiung High Court 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011; and Hualien High Court 2009 are missing, and the section composition that those courts in the immediately previous years are used.

The fifth regression, reported in column (5), adds in cases where information regarding the exact section composition is missing and we cannot infer section composition because these are the earliest years in our data. More specifically, Tainan

High Court 2003–2009 June and Hualien High Court 2003–2004 are missing. This regression includes a control variable that equals 1 for cases rendered during these periods in these courts.

The sixth regression includes all of the 84,335 cases. As compared with the fifth regression, it includes cases in which it is not entirely clear who serves as the presiding judge. We coded what we knew to be the longest-serving judge in the panel as the presiding judge. One additional control variable equals one for this type of cases.

V. Findings and Discussion

This Part discusses mainly the variables related to assigned judges and the effect of mixed panels. As explained above and formulated in Hypothesis (6), almost all of the variables regarding presiding judges are statistically insignificant at the 10% level, and in any event, TP presiding judges are extreme outliers. To our surprise, side judges sometimes show similar effects with assigned judges. The take-away is that familiarity does matter.

A. *Familiarity with Reviewed Courts Decreases Reversal Rate*

When the assigned judge, no matter being a TP judge or a permanent judge, handles a case appealed from its home court, the appeal is reversed 1.1 to 1.4 percentage points less frequently than that appealed from other district courts (Table 4 and Figure 2). As the baseline mean reversal rate is 38 percent, the effect is a 4 percent decrease in the probability of reversal (1.4/38=4%). Hypothesis (1) is thus borne out by our data.

B. *TP Judges Refrain from Reversing*

Table 4 and Figure 3 show that TP judges as assigned judges reversed 4.0–5.2 percentage points less frequently than permanent High Court judges. As the baseline mean reversal rate is 38 percent, the effect is a 14 percent decrease in the probability of reversal (5.2/38=14%). Hypothesis (2) is thus borne out by our data as well.

Table 5 and Figure 4 show that the effect is largest in the first year of the TP stint and the effect size decreases over the three years (see also Figure 8).[15] This is subject to two interpretations. First, the TP judges had served in a district court for over ten years and in the first year out of that district court and in an appellate court, the empathy bias is strongest; thus, the TP judges tend not to reverse. Second, the TP judges were more cautious than permanent High Court judges in reversing District Court decisions, as they have not mastered the skills of reviewing appeals. One year into the role of appellate judges, TP judges become more comfortable and reverse more often — still, Table 5 and Figure 4 show that their reversal rates in the second and third years are still lower than permanent High Court judges.

To examine which of the two interpretations is more convincing, it is useful to run our regression models in a subset of cases in which High Court judges are new to the post and yet they already had appellate judging experience. This unique situation arises when a TP judge returned to district court after the TP stint and then a few years later are promoted permanently to a High Court. If these judges reverse less frequently in their first three years back than in their fourth years or later, attributing this effect to their inexperience is less convincing, as they already have three years of High Court experience when serving as TP judges. Table 6 and Figure 5 show exactly this pattern. The three dummies that capture the reversal rates in the first three years of these TP-

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[15] The F-test for the difference in coefficients is statistically significant at the 0.1% level.

alumni judges' tenure after being permanently promoted to High Courts have negative coefficients and are highly statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Moreover, the negative coefficients increase over the three years, supporting Hypothesis (4). The coefficient for the first year is -30 percentage points. As the mean reversal rate in this subset of observations is about 39%, the effect is a shocking 77 percent decrease in the probability of reversal (30/39=77%).

Table 5 and Figure 4 show that the absolute values of the dummy variables on the three years of TP stint decrease from the first year to the second year, and from the second year to the third year,[16] inconsistent with Hypothesis (5). As the fading patterns for TP judges and permanently promoted TP-alumni judges are the same (Table 5 and Table 6; Figure 4 and Figure 5) — that is, our results suggest that we only need Hypothesis (4), which is supported by data regarding both types of judges. The implication is that anticipatory collegiality does not lead Taiwanese judges to reverse their future colleagues less frequently. Somewhat puzzlingly, in the third and final year of the TP stint, TP judges reverse their home court colleagues *more* often (***Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 3rd Year*** is statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level in Table 5). Although the size of the coefficient is not large enough to cancel out that of the third-year dummy and the ***Assigned Judge from Home Court*** dummy, this variable's consistent (marginal) statistically significant calls for a good explanation. We have conjectured that perhaps it is the TP judges who will stay at High Courts came to reverse home court cases more. In unreported models, we added another interaction term that is the multiplication of ***Assigned Judge: TP*Same Court: 3rd Year*** and a dummy variable on whether the TP judge will stay at High Court, but both ***Assigned Judge: TP*Same Court: 3rd Year*** and the interaction term become statistically

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[16] The F-test for the difference in coefficients is statistically significant at the 10% level.

insignificant, leaving the puzzle unresolved.

Moreover, inconsistent with Hypothesis (6), our results show that TP judges as side judges are also associated with statistically significantly lower reversal rates (though the home court bias for side judges is not statistically significant). Table 5 and Figure 3 show that the absolute value of the effect size also decreases for side judges over the three years of the TP stint.[17] Digging deeper, we examine the reversal pattern for side judges who are recently permanently promoted from district court after TP stints a few years ago, and find that these judges, in their first three years back to High Courts, also have lower reversal rates, and the absolute value of the effect size also decreases year by year (Table 7 and Figure 6).[18] The powers of the general bias and empathy bias are beyond our expectations.

C. *TP Judges Are Not Less Prone to Reverse Home Court Cases*

Table 4 shows that the interaction term of ***Assigned Judge Is TP*** and ***Assigned Judge from Home Court*** is statistically insignificant. Hypothesis (3) is thus not supported.

D. *Familiarity with Co-Panelists Increases Reversal Rate*

As columns (2)–(6) of Table 4 and Figure 7 show, mixed panels reversed 1.5 to 1.8 percentage points less frequently than pure panels, members of which generally have sit on the bench together dozens or hundreds of times. As the baseline mean reversal rate is 38 percent, the effect is a 5 percent decrease in the probability of reversal (1.8/38=5%). Hypothesis (7) is supported.

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[17] The F-test for the difference in coefficients is statistically significant at the 0.1% level.

[18] The F-test for the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant at the 10% level, though.

E. *Robustness Checks*

To make sure our results are robust to modeling choices, we have also run logistic regression models. While the new paradigm in econometrics appear to favor the use of linear probability models when the dependent variable is binary, the conventional wisdom in statistics prefers the use of, for instance, logistic regression models. Figure B. 1–Figure B. 5 in Appendix B report a series of coefficient plots that show the key results from logistic regression models with the same model specifications. The results are qualitatively similar. Note that logistic regression models for the TP-alum side judges' second stint (the LPM models of which are reported in Table 7) fails to converge (likely because all the variables in these models are binary), so no results are reported here.

Moreover, an alternative specification of our treatment variables has been used. Studies on judicial panel effects in U.S. federal courts have used other specifications to take into account the effect of the presence of, say, female or Democrat judges in a panel. Take gender as an example, on the assumption that federal judges have only two genders, the treatment variables can be specified as several binary variables that represent the combination of judges' genders in a panel: (M, M, F), (M, F, F), and (F, F, F), with a all-male panel (M, M, M) as the baseline. In a similar fashion, our home court bias hypothesis can be tested by including three binary variables, representing one, two, or three judges in the High Court panels are from home courts, with zero judges from home courts as the baseline. In addition, two TP judge variables can be added to represent "one TP judge in the panel" and "two or three TP judges in the panel",[19] with zero TP judges in the panel as the baseline. Using these five variables

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[19] In only eight observations, all three judges in the panel are TP judges, so these are merged into the observations with two TP judges.

to substitute for the treatment variables shown in the bracket in Equation (1), we ran LPM models. Figure B. 6 show that none of the three variables are statistically significant, which is not surprising, because from our main results we know that only assigned judges from home courts have created panel effects, and this alternative specification mixes together the effects of assigned judges and the two other types of judges. By contrast, Figure B. 7 show that the two TP judge variables are both highly statistically significant at the 1% level. This is also not surprising, because from our main results we know that both the assigned judges and side judges create significant panel effects while barely any presiding judges are TP judges.

We do not prefer this alternative specification for the following reasons. First, unlike in the American context, assigned, presiding, and side judges are roles determined before judges start to handle the filed disputes. From interviews with judges, prior research (Lin and Chang 2023), and our theoretical conjectures, we expect the impact of these three type of judges to differ; thus, juxtaposing them into simply one, two, or three judges throws out critical information. Second, relatedly, in total six interaction terms have to be added to this alternative specification to fully match the specification, and interpreting six such terms could be difficult. (In unreported regressions, we included these interaction terms, and only one of them — two TP judges and one judge from home court — is statistically significant at the 10% level, and there is no good, intuitive story for this.) Third, under our main specifications, we can easily separate out the different effects over the first three years of the tenure of a TP judge or a TP-alum judge. By contrast, under this alternative specification, tracing the pattern of reversal in the tenure of Judge 1 or Judge 2 (without utilizing their role in the panel or their TP status) is not meaningful. Therefore, we believe that our specifications, elaborated in Part III.B, is superior.

VI. CONCLUSION

Empirically examining all the High Court substantive decisions in 2003–2019 in Taiwan, randomly assigned to judges, we shed light on the collegiality, familiarity, and "thinking fast" literature regarding judicial behaviors. The two causes underpinning familiarity both shape judicial behaviors: Appellate judges exhibit home court bias, empathy bias, and general bias (the latter two fading away), and mixed panels reverse less frequently than pure panels. If the behavior patterns of senior permanent appellate court judges from the same section handling non-home court cases are the proper baseline, our empirical studies show that many factors not necessarily relevant to the merit of the appeal itself could affect dispositions. Some biases are easier to address. Case assignment algorithms can assign fewer home court cases. A court section could be enlarged to five or six judges so that a judge sits in panels regularly work with several colleagues, reducing the frequency of mixed panels and the curse of unfamiliarity. Other biases are harder to correct, as TP judges are associated with lower reversal rates no matter as assigned judges or side judges. The TP program, to the extent it creates learning effect, may be worth kept. In a judicial hierarchy within a career judge system, it seems inevitable to promote judges from lower courts to higher courts. That said, it is still premature to brainstorm seriously about reforms, as familiarity is only a nascent field, and numerous puzzles remain.

TABLES

Table 1 Section Size and TP Judge

Number of judges in the section	No TP judge in the section	TP judges in the section	*Total*
3	6,130	2,800	8,930
4	18,759	42,334	61,093
5	1,593	1,108	2,701
6	219	105	324
7	0	76	76
Total	26,701	46,423	73,124

Notes: Not included in this table are 6300 cases in which judges are from different sections; 3153 cases in which the related section information was not provided to us; and 1758 cases rendered by the Hualien High Court.

Table 2 Summary Statistics for Key Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.
Reversal	0.3800	0.49
Assigned Judge is TP	0.2660	0.44
Assigned Judge from Home Court	0.3811	0.49
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court	0.0969	0.30
Presiding Judge Is TP	0.0005	0.02
Presiding Judge from Home Court	0.3071	0.46
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court	0.0002	0.01
Side Judge Is TP	0.3163	0.47
Side Judge from Home Court	0.4009	0.49
Side Judge: TP*Home Court	0.1221	0.33
Panel Judges from Different Sections	0.0747	0.26

Notes: N=84,335. All variables are binary. The information about whether the presiding judge is a TP judge and whether the case was appealed from the same court that the presiding judge has worked in is accurate in 82,055 cases. In 2,280 cases (used only in column 6 of Table 4), the information is inferred.

Table 3 Judges' TP Experience

	Never been a TP	Been a TP	Total
Never been a TP	197	0	198
Return to district courts	0	114	114
Return to district courts, but not the civil division	0	20	20
Resign before TP period ends	0	5	5
Stay in the High Court	0	76	76
Total	197	215	412

Table 4 LPM Regression Results for Treatment Variables

Dependent variable: Reverse District Court Decision =1; Dismiss Appeal =0.						
	(1) Clean	(2) +different sections	(3) +Hualien	(4) +inferred, late cases	(5) +inferred early cases	(6) All
Assigned Judge Is TP	-0.052***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.043***	-0.040***	-0.041***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Assigned Judge from Home Court	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.012*	-0.011+	-0.010+	-0.011+
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Presiding Judge Is TP	-0.048	-0.053	-0.054	-0.056	-0.053	-0.066
	(0.186)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.152)
Presiding Judge from Home Court	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court	0.023	-0.139	-0.141	-0.140	-0.135	-0.145
	(0.187)	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.156)
Side Judge Is TP	-0.054***	-0.060***	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.054***	-0.051***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Side Judge from Home Court	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court	-0.010	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Panel Judges from Different Sections		-0.018*	-0.017*	-0.017*	-0.017*	-0.015+
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Fixed Effects and Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	69422	74237	76026	79061	82055	84335
Reversal Rate	38.5	38.3	38.2	38.2	38.0	38.0
R^2	0.050	0.049	0.050	0.049	0.049	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.036	0.037	0.036	0.036	0.036

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by assigned judges, are in parentheses. TP stands for transitory promotion. This table reports results from linear probability models (LPMs). Fixed effects for Case Types, Case Years, District Courts, Assigned Judges, Presiding Judges, and Side Judges are included. The reported reversal rate is the mean reversal rate for all the observations used in the regression. Full results of these regressions are reported in Table A. 2. $^+ p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01, ^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table 5 LPM Regression Results for Treatment Variables: Alternative Specification

Dependent variable: Reverse District Court Decision =1; Dismiss Appeal =0.						
	(1) Clean	(2) +different sections	(3) +Hualien	(4) +inferred, late cases	(5) +inferred early cases	(6) All
Assigned Judge Is TP: 1st year	-0.089***	-0.076***	-0.077***	-0.072***	-0.068***	-0.071***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Assigned Judge Is TP: 2nd year	-0.048***	-0.038**	-0.038**	-0.035**	-0.032**	-0.034**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Assigned Judge Is TP: 3rd year	-0.037**	-0.030*	-0.030*	-0.028*	-0.026*	-0.025*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Assigned Judge from Home Court	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.012*	-0.011+	-0.010+	-0.011+
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 1st Year	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.012	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 2nd Year	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 3rd Year	0.031*	0.032*	0.032*	0.030*	0.028+	0.028+
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Side Judge Is TP: 1st year	-0.093***	-0.094***	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.088***	-0.086***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Side Judge Is TP: 2nd year	-0.058***	-0.061***	-0.057***	-0.055***	-0.052***	-0.050***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Side Judge Is TP: 3rd year	-0.039**	-0.044***	-0.041***	-0.040**	-0.039**	-0.035**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Side Judge from Home Court	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court: 1st Year	-0.004	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court: 2nd Year	-0.021	-0.019	-0.019	-0.020+	-0.020	-0.021+
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court: 3rd Year	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Fixed Effects and Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	69422	74237	76026	79061	82055	84335
Reversal Rate	38.5	38.3	38.2	38.2	38.0	38.0
R^2						
Adjusted R^2						

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by assigned judges, are in parentheses. Fixed effects for Case Types, Case Years, District Courts, Assigned Judges, Presiding Judges, and Side Judges are included. TP stands for transitory promotion. This table reports results from linear probability models (LPMs). The reported reversal rate is the mean reversal rate for all the observations used in the regression. Full results of these regressions are reported in Table A. 3. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table 6 LPM Regression Results for Treatment Variables (Only If Assigned Judges Were Former TP and Permanently Promoted)

Dependent Variable: Reverse District Court Decision =1; Dismiss Appeal =0.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Clean	+different sections	+Hualien	+inferred, late cases
Assigned Judge's 2nd Stint: 1st year	-0.303***	-0.301***	-0.301***	-0.304***
	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Assigned Judge's 2nd Stint: 2nd year	-0.191***	-0.188***	-0.185***	-0.183***
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Assigned Judge's 2nd Stint: 3rd year	-0.113**	-0.103**	-0.099**	-0.099**
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Fixed Effects and Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6839	7168	7399	7412
Reversal Rate	39.2	39.3	39.2	39.1
R^2	0.108	0.108	0.110	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.067	0.068	0.068

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by assigned judges, are in parentheses. This table reports results from linear probability models (LPMs). Fixed Effects for Case Types, Case Years, District Courts, Assigned Judges, Presiding Judges, and Side Judges are included. The reported reversal rate is the mean reversal rate for all the observations used in the regression. We did not run models (5) and (6) because they would include the same observations as model (4). Full results of these regressions are reported in Table A. 4. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table 7 LPM Regression Results for Treatment Variables (Only If Side Judges Were Former TP and Permanently Promoted)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable: Reverse District Court Decision =1; Dismiss Appeal =0.				
	Clean	+different sections	+Hualien	+inferred, late cases
Side Judge's 2nd Stint: 1st year	-0.187**	-0.202***	-0.199***	-0.197***
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Side Judge's 2nd Stint: 2nd year	-0.108**	-0.122***	-0.120***	-0.119***
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Side Judge's 2nd Stint: 3rd year	-0.081*	-0.091**	-0.090**	-0.090**
	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Fixed Effects and Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7340	7716	7939	7972
Reversal Rate	39.3	39.0	38.7	38.8
R^2	0.108	0.109	0.110	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.057	0.056	0.056	0.056

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by assigned judges, are in parentheses. This table reports results from linear probability models (LPMs). The reported reversal rate is the mean reversal rate for all the observations used in the regression. Fixed Effects for Case Types, Case Years, District Courts, Assigned Judges, Presiding Judges, and Side Judges are included. We did not run models (5) and (6) because they would include the same observations as model (4). Full results of these regressions are reported in Table A. 5. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

FIGURES

Figure 1 TP Judges Tenure at High Courts

Notes: N=215. One TP judge, one circle, diamond, or X. Jitter effects apply. Because our data stops at June 30, 2019, the TP length of TP judges who started serving in 2016 or later is truncated. Three Xs near TP length of two years show three judges who were transferred to the Judicial Yuan for administrative duties and later returned to High Courts. TP Length, the Y variable, is calculated based on the dates a TP judge's first and last decision in High Courts; thus, it will not be exactly three years. For TP judges who we identified as staying at High Courts after the TP stint, we manually cap their tenure at 3 years after their first decided case as a TP judge. This scatterplot also shows that several TP judges returned to district courts after one or two years in High Courts.

Figure 2 Coefficient Plots for Assigned and Side Judges Taking Home Court Cases

Notes: The thicker, shorter lines represent the 90% confidence interval, and the thinner, longer lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure 3 Coefficient Plots for Assigned and Side TP Judges

Notes: The thickest, shortest lines represent the 90% confidence interval; The thicker, shorter lines represent the 95% confidence interval; and the thinnest, longest lines represent the 99% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure 4 Coefficient Plots for Key Variables from Table 5

Notes: The thicker, shorter lines represent the 90% confidence interval, and the thinner, longer lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure 5 Coefficient Plots for Key Variables from Table 6

Notes: The thicker, shorter lines represent the 90% confidence interval, and the thinner, longer lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure 6 Coefficient Plots for Key Variables from Table 7

Notes: The thicker, shorter lines represent the 90% confidence interval, and the thinner, longer lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure 7 Coefficient Plots for Mixed Panels

Notes: The thicker, shorter lines represent the 90% confidence interval, and the thinner, longer lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure 8 Judge Role and Reversal Rate

Notes: This is a binned scatterplot. A necessary condition for a case to be include in this figure is that we have complete information (that is, only those used in the regression reported in column (1) of Table 4 could be included). This figure excludes cases from plots d, e, and f, if the assigned, presiding, and side judges were promoted to High Courts before 2000, because we were unable to calculate their length of tenure, as full texts of pre-2000 court cases in Taiwan were not available. Each plot contains a quadratic fitted line.

APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES

Table A. 1 Summary Statistics for Other Variables

Other Controls	Mean	Std. Dev.
Assigned Judge Is Presiding Judge	0.0811	0.27
No Exact Section Information	0.0374	0.19
Judge Role Inferred	0.0270	0.16
Case Types		
Relatively Low Stake	0.3929	0.49
High Stake	0.1801	0.38
State Compensation	0.0216	0.15
International Trade	0.0005	0.02
Insurance	0.0233	0.15
Labor	0.0630	0.24
Construction	0.0460	0.21
Maritime	0.0023	0.05
Consumer Protection	0.0024	0.05
Election	0.0081	0.09
Financial	0.0039	0.06
Aboriginal	0.0027	0.05
Trade Secret	0.0004	0.02
Medical	0.0088	0.09
Claim Types		
Property Law	0.4604	0.50
Contract Law	0.7626	0.43
Public Law	0.0129	0.11
Commercial Law	0.0041	0.06
Procedural Law	0.0461	0.21
Other Disputes	0.0261	0.16
Case Years		
2002	0.0118	0.11
2003	0.0502	0.22
2004	0.0503	0.22
2005	0.0498	0.22
2006	0.0558	0.23

2007	0.0550	0.23
2008	0.0556	0.23
2009	0.0600	0.24
2010	0.0630	0.24
2011	0.0684	0.25
2012	0.0692	0.25
2013	0.0703	0.26
2014	0.0729	0.26
2015	0.0782	0.27
2016	0.0729	0.26
2017	0.0631	0.24
2018	0.0471	0.21
2019	0.0063	0.08
District Courts		
Taipei	0.2217	0.42
Shilin	0.0671	0.25
Xinbei	0.1109	0.31
Taoyuan	0.0768	0.27
Hsinchu	0.0311	0.17
Miaoli	0.0164	0.13
Taichung	0.1170	0.32
Changhua	0.0416	0.20
Nantou	0.0179	0.13
Yunlin	0.0172	0.13
Chiayi	0.0303	0.17
Tainan	0.0614	0.24
Kaohsiung	0.1017	0.30
Pintung	0.0255	0.16
Taitung	0.0076	0.09
Keelung	0.0150	0.12
Yilan	0.0155	0.12
Hualien	0.0170	0.13
Penghu	0.0026	0.05
Ciaotou	0.0057	0.08

Notes: N=84,335. All variables are binary. As fixed effects for assigned judges are included in the regression, there is no need to add a dummy variable to capture whether the assigned judges worked in the criminal division before being promoted to High Courts.

Table A. 2 Full Regression Results

Dependent variable: Reverse District Court Decision =1; Dismiss Appeal =0.

	(1) Clean	(2) +different sections	(3) +Hualien	(4) +inferred, late cases	(5) +inferred early cases	(6) All
Assigned Judge Is TP	-0.052***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.043***	-0.040***	-0.041***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Assigned Judge from Home Court	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.012*	-0.011+	-0.010+	-0.011+
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Presiding Judge Is TP	-0.048	-0.053	-0.054	-0.056	-0.053	-0.066
	(0.186)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.152)
Presiding Judge from Home Court	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court	0.023	-0.139	-0.141	-0.140	-0.135	-0.145
	(0.187)	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.156)
Side Judge Is TP	-0.054***	-0.060***	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.054***	-0.051***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Side Judge from Home Court	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court	-0.010	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Panel Judges from Different Sections		-0.018*	-0.017*	-0.017*	-0.017*	-0.015+
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
No Administrative Tables from Courts					-0.093***	-0.081***
					(0.020)	(0.020)
Presiding Judge Information Not Exact						-0.022
						(0.029)
Assigned & Presiding Judge Same Person	0.020+	0.024*	0.024*	0.023*	0.020*	0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Relatively Low Stake	-0.023***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
High Stake	0.019***	0.022***	0.023***	0.023***	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
State Compensation Suit	-0.039*	-0.042**	-0.041**	-0.039**	-0.035*	-0.035*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
International Trade Suit	0.163*	0.160*	0.160*	0.161*	0.160*	0.157*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Insurance Suit	-0.101***	-0.098***	-0.100***	-0.096***	-0.098***	-0.098***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Labor Suit	-0.007	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Construction Suit	0.125***	0.123***	0.125***	0.125***	0.123***	0.124***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Maritime Suit	-0.040	-0.022	-0.021	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Consumer Suit	-0.017	-0.010	-0.005	-0.005	-0.008	-0.002
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Election Suit	-0.187***	-0.179***	-0.180***	-0.180***	-0.178***	-0.180***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Financial Suit	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Aboriginal Suit	0.059	0.052	0.064*	0.065*	0.063*	0.063*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Trade Secret Suit	0.252**	0.221**	0.220**	0.222**	0.219**	0.223**
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Medical Suit	-0.223***	-0.224***	-0.226***	-0.218***	-0.215***	-0.217***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Year 2003	-0.129***	-0.121***	-0.120***	-0.131***	-0.128***	-0.125***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Year 2004	-0.141***	-0.128***	-0.127***	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.129***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Year 2005	-0.184***	-0.174***	-0.172***	-0.172***	-0.173***	-0.169***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Year 2006	-0.196***	-0.180***	-0.183***	-0.189***	-0.193***	-0.190***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Year 2007	-0.176***	-0.166***	-0.167***	-0.166***	-0.176***	-0.171***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Year 2008	-0.183***	-0.174***	-0.175***	-0.174***	-0.187***	-0.185***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Year 2009	-0.190***	-0.177***	-0.178***	-0.182***	-0.189***	-0.186***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Year 2010	-0.213***	-0.201***	-0.202***	-0.207***	-0.215***	-0.211***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Year 2011	-0.238***	-0.225***	-0.224***	-0.232***	-0.240***	-0.235***

	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Year 2012	-0.258***	-0.243***	-0.242***	-0.243***	-0.251***	-0.245***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Year 2013	-0.281***	-0.267***	-0.269***	-0.271***	-0.276***	-0.269***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Year 2014	-0.337***	-0.325***	-0.323***	-0.325***	-0.327***	-0.318***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Year 2015	-0.373***	-0.354***	-0.353***	-0.354***	-0.354***	-0.344***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Year 2016	-0.386***	-0.369***	-0.368***	-0.368***	-0.366***	-0.356***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Year 2017	-0.447***	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.422***	-0.419***	-0.410***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Year 2018	-0.495***	-0.473***	-0.472***	-0.470***	-0.466***	-0.456***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Year 2019	-0.557***	-0.537***	-0.533***	-0.529***	-0.525***	-0.515***
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Shilin District Court	-0.015	-0.017+	-0.016+	-0.016+	-0.016+	-0.016+
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Xinbei District Court	0.027***	0.026***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Taoyuan District Court	0.016+	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Hsinchu District Court	-0.012	-0.019+	-0.019+	-0.018+	-0.018+	-0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Miaoli District Court	-0.144	-0.151	-0.119	-0.093	-0.063	-0.085
	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.079)
Taichung District Court	-0.150	-0.157	-0.125	-0.100	-0.070	-0.091
	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.079)	(0.076)
Changhua District Court	-0.081	-0.089	-0.056	-0.030	-0.001	-0.024
	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Nantou District Court	-0.144	-0.152	-0.120	-0.094	-0.065	-0.084
	(0.126)	(0.118)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.082)	(0.079)
Yunlin District Court	0.002	-0.038	-0.195	-0.224	-0.165+	-0.174*
	(0.143)	(0.133)	(0.313)	(0.251)	(0.087)	(0.080)
Chiayi District Court	0.076	0.041	-0.115	-0.152	-0.123	-0.136+
	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.313)	(0.251)	(0.086)	(0.080)
Tainan District Court	0.039	0.003	-0.154	-0.183	-0.144+	-0.157+

	(0.141)	(0.130)	(0.312)	(0.249)	(0.087)	(0.080)
Kaohsiung District Court	-0.314	-0.649***	-0.649***	-0.657***	-0.660***	-0.615***
	(0.211)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.107)
Pintung District Court	-0.283	-0.622***	-0.620***	-0.627***	-0.630***	-0.580***
	(0.215)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.107)
Taitung District Court			0.109	0.167	0.160	0.115
			(0.236)	(0.177)	(0.130)	(0.129)
Keelung District Court	0.030[+]	0.029[+]	0.029[+]	0.030[*]	0.029[+]	0.027[+]
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Yilan District Court	-0.002	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Hualien District Court			0.176	0.228	0.229[+]	0.188
			(0.235)	(0.174)	(0.128)	(0.126)
Penghu District Court	-0.314	-0.652***	-0.651***	-0.661***	-0.664***	-0.626***
	(0.211)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.112)
Ciaotou District Court	-0.373[+]	-0.679***	-0.677***	-0.683***	-0.688***	-0.635***
	(0.215)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.108)
Property Law	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.039***	-0.040***	-0.040***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Contract Law	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.033***	-0.033***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Public Law	-0.113***	-0.115***	-0.113***	-0.104***	-0.109***	-0.109***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Commercial Law	-0.115***	-0.115***	-0.114***	-0.114***	-0.117***	-0.117***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Procedural Law	-0.071***	-0.073***	-0.072***	-0.077***	-0.080***	-0.080***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Other Disputes	-0.097	-0.072	-0.065	-0.059	-0.078	0.015
	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.031)
Constant	1.108***	1.100***	1.265***	1.289***	1.003***	0.993***
	(0.145)	(0.128)	(0.314)	(0.251)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Observations	69422	74237	76026	79061	82055	84335
R^2	0.050	0.049	0.050	0.049	0.049	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.036	0.037	0.036	0.036	0.036

Notes: This table the full regression results (highlights of which appear in Table 4), except for the fixed effects for assigned, presiding, and side judges.

Table A. 3 Full Regression Results: Alternative Specification

Dependent variable: Reverse District Court Decision =1; Dismiss Appeal =0.

	(1) Clean	(2) +different sections	(3) +Hualien	(4) +inferred, late cases	(5) +inferred early cases	(6) All
Assigned Judge Is TP: 1st year	-0.089***	-0.076***	-0.077***	-0.072***	-0.068***	-0.071***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Assigned Judge Is TP: 2nd year	-0.048***	-0.038**	-0.038**	-0.035**	-0.032**	-0.034**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Assigned Judge Is TP: 3rd year	-0.037**	-0.030*	-0.030*	-0.028*	-0.026*	-0.025*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Assigned Judge from Home Court	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.012*	-0.011+	-0.010+	-0.011+
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 1st Year	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.012	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 2nd Year	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court: 3rd Year	0.031*	0.032*	0.032*	0.030*	0.028+	0.028+
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Presiding Judge Is TP: 1st year	0.345*	-0.273	-0.275	-0.276	-0.278	-0.279
	(0.142)	(0.290)	(0.289)	(0.289)	(0.288)	(0.288)
Presiding Judge Is TP: 2nd year	-0.188	-0.172	-0.171	-0.165	-0.163	-0.113
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.088)
Presiding Judge Is TP: 3rd year	-0.032	0.255	0.255	0.251	0.258	0.214
	(0.230)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.219)	(0.208)
Presiding Judge from Home Court	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court: 1st Year	0.360	0.171	0.171	0.171	0.171	0.168
	(0.263)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court: 2nd Year	-0.030	-0.139	-0.147	-0.160	-0.145	-0.298**
	(0.160)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.145)	(0.108)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court: 3rd Year	-0.325	-0.616**	-0.616**	-0.612**	-0.589*	-0.543*
	(0.246)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.234)	(0.230)	(0.218)
Side Judge Is TP: 1st year	-0.093***	-0.094***	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.088***	-0.086***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Side Judge Is TP: 2nd year	-0.058***	-0.061***	-0.057***	-0.055***	-0.052***	-0.050***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Side Judge Is TP: 3rd year	-0.039**	-0.044***	-0.041***	-0.040**	-0.039**	-0.035**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Side Judge from Home Court	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court: 1st Year	-0.004	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court: 2nd Year	-0.021	-0.019	-0.019	-0.020+	-0.020	-0.021+
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court: 3rd Year	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Panel Judges from Different Sections		-0.016+	-0.015+	-0.014+	-0.014+	-0.013
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
No Administrative Tables from Courts					-0.099***	-0.087***
					(0.021)	(0.020)
Presiding Judge Information Not Exact						-0.024
						(0.029)
Assigned & Presiding Judge Same Person	0.023+	0.027*	0.027*	0.026*	0.023*	0.024*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Relatively Low Stake	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High Stake	0.019**	0.021***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
State Compensation Suit	-0.039*	-0.041**	-0.040**	-0.039**	-0.035*	-0.035*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
International Trade Suit	0.163*	0.160*	0.160*	0.161*	0.160*	0.157*
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Insurance Suit	-0.101***	-0.099***	-0.100***	-0.096***	-0.098***	-0.098***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Labor Suit	-0.007	-0.010	-0.009	-0.011	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Construction Suit	0.123***	0.121***	0.123***	0.123***	0.122***	0.122***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Maritime Suit	-0.041	-0.022	-0.022	-0.016	-0.015	-0.017
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Consumer Suit	-0.019	-0.011	-0.007	-0.007	-0.010	-0.004
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Election Suit	-0.187***	-0.180***	-0.180***	-0.180***	-0.179***	-0.181***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Financial Suit	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Aboriginal Suit	0.059	0.051	0.064*	0.064*	0.063*	0.063*
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Trade Secret Suit	0.251**	0.220**	0.219**	0.221**	0.219**	0.223**
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Medical Suit	-0.226***	-0.226***	-0.228***	-0.220***	-0.217***	-0.219***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Year 2003	-0.129***	-0.121***	-0.121***	-0.131***	-0.128***	-0.125***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Year 2004	-0.140***	-0.128***	-0.127***	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.128***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Year 2005	-0.182***	-0.172***	-0.170***	-0.170***	-0.171***	-0.167***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Year 2006	-0.195***	-0.180***	-0.182***	-0.188***	-0.193***	-0.189***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Year 2007	-0.173***	-0.164***	-0.166***	-0.164***	-0.174***	-0.169***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Year 2008	-0.181***	-0.173***	-0.174***	-0.172***	-0.186***	-0.184***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Year 2009	-0.192***	-0.179***	-0.181***	-0.184***	-0.191***	-0.188***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Year 2010	-0.214***	-0.201***	-0.203***	-0.207***	-0.215***	-0.211***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Year 2011	-0.240***	-0.226***	-0.226***	-0.233***	-0.241***	-0.235***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Year 2012	-0.263***	-0.247***	-0.246***	-0.247***	-0.255***	-0.249***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Year 2013	-0.287***	-0.273***	-0.274***	-0.276***	-0.281***	-0.274***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Year 2014	-0.346***	-0.332***	-0.331***	-0.332***	-0.333***	-0.324***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Year 2015	-0.387***	-0.367***	-0.365***	-0.366***	-0.364***	-0.355***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Year 2016	-0.406***	-0.386***	-0.386***	-0.386***	-0.381***	-0.372***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Year 2017	-0.472***	-0.445***	-0.446***	-0.444***	-0.439***	-0.430***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Year 2018	-0.528***	-0.501***	-0.501***	-0.498***	-0.492***	-0.482***

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Year 2019	-0.593***	-0.568***	-0.565***	-0.560***	-0.553***	-0.544***
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Shilin District Court	-0.015	-0.017+	-0.016+	-0.016+	-0.016+	-0.016+
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Xinbei District Court	0.027***	0.026***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Taoyuan District Court	0.016+	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Hsinchu District Court	-0.012	-0.019+	-0.018+	-0.018+	-0.018+	-0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Miaoli District Court	-0.149	-0.157	-0.119	-0.099	-0.081	-0.104
	(0.123)	(0.115)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.081)	(0.079)
Taichung District Court	-0.154	-0.163	-0.126	-0.106	-0.088	-0.110
	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.079)	(0.076)
Changhua District Court	-0.086	-0.094	-0.057	-0.037	-0.018	-0.043
	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Nantou District Court	-0.149	-0.158	-0.121	-0.100	-0.082	-0.102
	(0.123)	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.082)	(0.079)
Yunlin District Court	-0.018	-0.045	-0.231	-0.263	-0.182*	-0.193*
	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.322)	(0.256)	(0.086)	(0.080)
Chiayi District Court	0.055	0.034	-0.152	-0.191	-0.140	-0.154+
	(0.137)	(0.129)	(0.321)	(0.256)	(0.085)	(0.080)
Tainan District Court	0.020	-0.003	-0.189	-0.221	-0.161+	-0.175*
	(0.138)	(0.128)	(0.320)	(0.254)	(0.086)	(0.080)
Kaohsiung District Court	-0.456*	-0.699***	-0.699***	-0.696***	-0.697***	-0.649***
	(0.221)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.107)
Pintung District Court	-0.423+	-0.670***	-0.669***	-0.666***	-0.667***	-0.613***
	(0.225)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.107)
Keelung District Court	0.031*	0.029+	0.030*	0.030*	0.030*	0.027+
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Yilan District Court	-0.002	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Penghu District Court	-0.455*	-0.702***	-0.700***	-0.699***	-0.700***	-0.660***
	(0.221)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.112)
Ciaotou District Court	-0.516*	-0.730***	-0.728***	-0.724***	-0.727***	-0.671***
	(0.224)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.108)
Taitung District Court			0.119	0.162	0.157	0.112
			(0.236)	(0.177)	(0.131)	(0.130)
Hualien District Court			0.185	0.223	0.225+	0.184
			(0.235)	(0.175)	(0.128)	(0.127)
Property Law	-0.039***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.039***	-0.040***	-0.040***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Contract Law	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.033***	-0.033***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Public Law	-0.113***	-0.114***	-0.113***	-0.104***	-0.108***	-0.109***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Commercial Law	-0.116***	-0.115***	-0.114***	-0.114***	-0.117***	-0.117***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Procedural Law	-0.071***	-0.073***	-0.072***	-0.077***	-0.080***	-0.080***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Other Disputes	-0.094	-0.077	-0.071	-0.064	-0.083	0.016
	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.031)
Constant	1.165***	1.137***	1.333***	1.355***	1.035***	1.026***
	(0.145)	(0.128)	(0.323)	(0.257)	(0.136)	(0.133)
Observations	69422	74237	76026	79061	82055	84335
R^2	0.051	0.049	0.051	0.050	0.050	0.049

Adjusted R^2		0.037	0.036	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037

Notes: This table the full regression results (highlights of which appear in Table 5), except for the fixed effects for assigned, presiding, and side judges.

Table A. 4 Full Regression Results (Only if Assigned Judges Are Former TP)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Clean	+different sections	+Hualien	+inferred, late cases
Assigned Judge=2nd stint 1st year	-0.303***	-0.301***	-0.301***	-0.304***
	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Assigned Judge=2nd stint 2nd year	-0.191***	-0.188***	-0.185***	-0.183***
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Assigned Judge=2nd stint 3rd year	-0.113**	-0.103**	-0.099**	-0.099**
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Assigned Judge from Same Court	-0.034	-0.041	-0.036	-0.036
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Presiding Judge Is TP	--	--	--	--
Presiding Judge from Same Court	0.026	0.027	0.023	0.023
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court	--	--	--	--
Side Judge Is TP	-0.048	-0.052	-0.051	-0.047
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Side Judge from Same Court	-0.026	-0.028	-0.034	-0.034
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Side Judge: TP*Home Court	-0.025	-0.020	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Assigned & Presiding Judge Same Person	0.171***	0.143*	0.142*	0.142*
	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Relatively Low Stake	-0.014	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
High Stake	-0.026	-0.023	-0.019	-0.020
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
State Compensation Suit	-0.001	-0.007	-0.024	-0.025
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)
International Trade Suit	0.533***	0.543***	0.546***	0.545***
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Insurance Suit	-0.134**	-0.136***	-0.138***	-0.137***
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Labor Suit	-0.050*	-0.048*	-0.050*	-0.050*

	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Construction Suit	0.120***	0.125***	0.136***	0.135***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Maritime Suit	0.234+	0.234+	0.234+	0.232+
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Consumer Suit	0.108	0.077	0.078	0.078
	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Election Suit	-0.297***	-0.307***	-0.286***	-0.281***
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Financial Suit	-0.015	-0.011	-0.012	-0.014
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Aboriginal Suit	0.145	0.148	0.100	0.100
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Trade Secret Suit	--	--	--	--
Medical Suit	-0.263***	-0.247***	-0.264***	-0.262***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Year 2004	-0.055	-0.064	-0.061	-0.061
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Year 2005	-0.416***	-0.424***	-0.427***	-0.426***
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Year 2006	-0.077	-0.085	-0.086	-0.088
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Year 2007	-0.254*	-0.261*	-0.263*	-0.263*
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Year 2008	-0.295***	-0.295***	-0.297***	-0.298***
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Year 2009	-0.391***	-0.398***	-0.400***	-0.404***
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Year 2010	-0.423***	-0.443***	-0.445***	-0.447***
	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Year 2011	-0.609***	-0.633***	-0.637***	-0.635***
	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Year 2012	-0.686***	-0.701***	-0.697***	-0.685***
	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Year 2013	-0.773***	-0.805***	-0.808***	-0.800***
	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Year 2014	-0.857***	-0.883***	-0.883***	-0.875***

	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Year 2015	-0.932***	-0.960***	-0.956***	-0.949***
	(0.086)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Year 2016	-1.056***	-1.086***	-1.085***	-1.078***
	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Year 2017	-1.128***	-1.153***	-1.148***	-1.142***
	(0.087)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Year 2018	-1.273***	-1.294***	-1.289***	-1.283***
	(0.095)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Year 2019	-1.326***	-1.354***	-1.349***	-1.344***
	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Shilin District Court	-0.060*	-0.060*	-0.060*	-0.060*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Xinbei District Court	0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Taoyuan District Court	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.004
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Hsinchu District Court	-0.041	-0.049	-0.049	-0.048
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Miaoli District Court	-1.525***	-1.538***	-1.542***	-1.523***
	(0.091)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.122)
Taichung District Court	-1.537***	-1.563***	-1.572***	-1.553***
	(0.081)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.122)
Changhua District Court	-1.444***	-1.479***	-1.482***	-1.464***
	(0.117)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.150)
Nantou District Court	-1.566***	-1.599***	-1.600***	-1.582***
	(0.100)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.132)
Yunlin District Court	-1.148***	-1.122***	-1.102***	-1.091***
	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)
Chiayi District Court	-1.033***	-1.010***	-0.990***	-0.980***
	(0.068)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Tainan District Court	-1.055***	-1.045***	-1.022***	-1.013***
	(0.062)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Kaohsiung District Court	-0.251**	-0.486***	-0.486***	-0.488***
	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.092)
Pintung District Court	-0.236*	-0.494***	-0.496***	-0.496***
	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.118)
Keelung District Court	0.039	0.026	0.027	0.027

	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Yilan District Court	-0.099*	-0.087*	-0.085*	-0.085*
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Penghu District Court	-0.062	-0.330***	-0.334***	-0.335***
	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.092)
Ciaotou District Court	-0.377***	-0.568***	-0.568***	-0.570***
	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.091)
Taitung District Court			-0.999***	-0.981***
			(0.089)	(0.087)
Hualien District Court			-0.886***	-0.868***
			(0.085)	(0.083)
Property Law	-0.027*	-0.029*	-0.032**	-0.033**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Contract Law	-0.012	-0.010	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Public Law	-0.081	-0.085	-0.077	-0.082
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Commercial Law	-0.094	-0.126	-0.111	-0.110
	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Procedural Law	0.012	0.009	0.004	0.003
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Other Disputes	-0.641***	0.505**	0.524**	0.514**
	(0.076)	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.178)
Constant	2.412***	2.450***	2.443***	2.439***
	(0.119)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Observations	6839	7168	7399	7412
R^2	0.108	0.108	0.110	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.067	0.068	0.068

Notes: This table the full regression results (highlights of which appear in Table 6), except for the fixed effects for assigned, presiding, and side judges.

Table A. 5 Full Regression Results (Only if Side Judges Are Former TP)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Clean	+different sections	+Hualien	+inferred, late cases
Assigned Judge Is TP	0.019	0.030	0.028	0.026
	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Assigned Judge from Same Court	-0.041*	-0.045*	-0.046*	-0.046*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Assigned Judge: TP*Home Court	0.013	0.018	0.019	0.019
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Presiding Judge Is TP	-0.259	-0.446	-0.443	-0.447
	(0.429)	(0.320)	(0.317)	(0.317)
Presiding Judge from Same Court	-0.000	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Presiding Judge: TP*Home Court	0.941***	0.874***	0.868***	0.858***
	(0.095)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Side Judge's 2nd Stint: 1st year	-0.187**	-0.202***	-0.199***	-0.197***
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Side Judge's 2nd Stint: 2nd year	-0.108**	-0.122***	-0.120***	-0.119***
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Side Judge's 2nd Stint: 3rd year	-0.081*	-0.091**	-0.090**	-0.090**
	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Side Judge from Same Court	0.007	0.007	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Assigned & Presiding Judge Same Person	0.040	-0.049	-0.055	-0.054
	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.061)
Relatively Low Stake	-0.010	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
High Stake	0.022	0.026	0.024	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
State Compensation Suit	0.008	0.009	0.022	0.018
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)
International Trade Suit	-0.432***	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.423***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Insurance Suit	-0.159***	-0.154***	-0.162***	-0.163***
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)

Labor Suit	-0.004	-0.012	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Construction Suit	0.195***	0.190***	0.189***	0.189***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Maritime Suit	0.031	0.035	0.034	0.014
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.109)
Consumer Suit	0.027	0.031	0.030	0.030
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Election Suit	-0.030	-0.053	-0.046	-0.075
	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.088)
Financial Suit	0.095	0.117	0.116	0.116
	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Aboriginal Suit	0.066	0.010	0.086	0.085
	(0.105)	(0.091)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Trade Secret Suit	--	--	--	--
	-0.321***	-0.326***	-0.326***	-0.325***
Medical Suit	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Year 2004	0.305***	0.195*	0.200*	0.204*
	(0.081)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.090)
Year 2005	0.430+	0.335	0.341	0.342
	(0.239)	(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.303)
Year 2006	0.184	0.081	0.086	0.089
	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.131)
Year 2007	0.663***	0.557***	0.561***	0.564***
	(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.094)
Year 2008	0.507***	0.405***	0.410***	0.412***
	(0.068)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.102)
Year 2009	0.379***	0.283**	0.288**	0.291**
	(0.057)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.088)
Year 2010	0.344***	0.238*	0.245*	0.249**
	(0.051)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Year 2011	0.314***	0.208*	0.209*	0.210*
	(0.058)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.096)
Year 2012	0.190**	0.100	0.106	0.103
	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.100)
Year 2013	0.136*	0.034	0.039	0.037
	(0.062)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.097)

Year 2014	0.083	-0.020	-0.015	-0.017
	(0.073)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.099)
Year 2015	-0.007	-0.101	-0.093	-0.095
	(0.070)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.102)
Year 2016	-0.034	-0.136	-0.129	-0.130
	(0.078)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.104)
Year 2017	-0.172*	-0.262*	-0.255*	-0.257*
	(0.080)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.107)
Year 2018	-0.214*	-0.314**	-0.306**	-0.307**
	(0.089)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Year 2019	-0.365***	-0.469***	-0.459***	-0.459***
	(0.105)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.131)
Shilin District Court	-0.001	-0.000	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Xinbei District Court	0.035	0.032	0.026	0.025
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Taoyuan District Court	0.037	0.037	0.030	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Hsinchu District Court	0.039	0.031	0.023	0.022
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Miaoli District Court	-0.613	-0.928*	-0.942**	-0.945**
	(0.451)	(0.361)	(0.360)	(0.359)
Taichung District Court	-0.600	-0.909*	-0.917*	-0.920*
	(0.450)	(0.361)	(0.359)	(0.359)
Changhua District Court	-0.468	-0.777*	-0.791*	-0.795*
	(0.456)	(0.369)	(0.367)	(0.367)
Nantou District Court	-0.646	-0.952*	-0.968*	-0.971*
	(0.466)	(0.381)	(0.379)	(0.379)
Yunlin District Court	-0.869+	-0.967*	-0.962*	-0.969*
	(0.510)	(0.401)	(0.398)	(0.398)
Chiayi District Court	-0.745	-0.818*	-0.812*	-0.820*
	(0.509)	(0.399)	(0.396)	(0.396)
Tainan District Court	-0.868+	-0.945*	-0.937*	-0.946*
	(0.507)	(0.397)	(0.393)	(0.393)
Kaohsiung District Court	-0.627	-0.813+	-0.791+	-0.781+
	(0.596)	(0.450)	(0.447)	(0.432)
Pintung District Court	-0.560	-0.747+	-0.737+	-0.733+
	(0.597)	(0.445)	(0.442)	(0.426)

Keelung District Court	0.100*	0.093*	0.087+	0.087+
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Yilan District Court	0.052	0.048	0.040	0.039
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Penghu District Court	-0.743	-0.946*	-0.932*	-0.959*
	(0.605)	(0.457)	(0.454)	(0.434)
Ciaotou District Court	-0.698	-0.862+	-0.850+	-0.842*
	(0.602)	(0.445)	(0.441)	(0.427)
Taitung District Court			0.175	0.180
			(0.389)	(0.387)
Hualien District Court			0.236	0.241
			(0.402)	(0.401)
Property Law	-0.049**	-0.046**	-0.046**	-0.045**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Contract Law	-0.023	-0.027	-0.025	-0.028
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Public Law	-0.126	-0.120	-0.130	-0.118
	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Commercial Law	-0.094	-0.101	-0.100	-0.101
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Procedural Law	-0.011	-0.021	-0.018	-0.026
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Other Disputes	-0.113*	-0.112*	-0.110*	0.259
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.210)
Constant	1.250**	1.646***	1.650***	1.659***
	(0.435)	(0.346)	(0.345)	(0.345)
Observations	7340	7716	7939	7972
R^2	0.108	0.109	0.110	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.057	0.056	0.056	0.056

Notes: This table the full regression results (highlights of which appear in Table 7), except for the fixed effects for assigned, presiding, and side judges.

APPENDIX B: RESULTS WITH ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND SPECIFICATIONS

Figure B. 1 Coefficient Plots for Assigned and Side Judges Taking Home Court Cases: Logistic Regression Models


Notes: Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 2.

Figure B. 2 Coefficient Plots for Assigned and Side TP Judges: Logistic Regression Models


*Notes*: Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 3.

Figure B. 3 Coefficient Plots for Fading Effects for TP Judges' First Stint: Logistic Regression Models

Notes: Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 4.

Figure B. 4 Coefficient Plots for Fading Effects for TP-alum, Assigned Judges'
Second Stint: Logistic Regression Models

Notes: Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 5.

Figure B. 5 Coefficient Plots for Mixed Panels: Logistic Regression Models

Notes: Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 7.

Figure B. 6 Coefficient Plots for Different Numbers of Judges from Home Court

Notes: The thicker, shorter lines represent the 90% confidence interval, and the thinner, longer lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

Figure B. 7 Coefficient Plots for Different Numbers of TP Judges in Panels

Notes: The thickest, shortest lines represent the 90% confidence interval; The thicker, shorter lines represent the 95% confidence interval; and the thinnest, longest lines represent the 99% confidence interval. Horizontal coefficient confidence intervals that cross the vertical, dashed line at 0 mean that the coefficient is not statistically significant at that level.

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